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This article explores the challenges facing governments in creating
a market for carbon dioxide (and other greenhouse gases, or GHGs),
offers some suggestions for how that market might best be created and
managed, and suggests how the creation of a carbon market helps us
better understand the role of governments in making sure that markets
reflect more of the true costs of the goods that are exchanged in those
markets than typically occurs. It addresses four questions: (1) How are
Carbon Emissions Market Externalities? (2) How Can Markets Reflect
the True Costs of Carbon Emissions? (3) What Is Required for an Effec-
tive Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program? and (4) How Can Carbon Trading
Help Make Markets Work More Effectively?
I argue that, in an economic system that largely relies on markets, as
the U.S. and global economies do, environmental quality is greatly de-
pendent on our ability to design and carry out public policies that ensure
prices of goods reflect all of the costs, including environmental ones, that
are involved in producing, using, and disposing of goods. Our failure to
ensure that markets work well-that prices accurately reflect true costs-
is at the heart of most environmental problems. Once markets are work-
ing as well as we can make them, there may still be the need for policies
that redistribute or otherwise alter market results, and environmental
justice inquiries will be a central concern, but our primary environmental
law and policy challenge is to figure out how to make markets work bet-
ter.
I. How ARE CARBON EMISSIONS MARKET EXTERNALITIES?
Climate science is extraordinarily complex, permeated by many un-
certainties about the causes, consequences, distribution, and timing of
climate change. One way to try to make some sense of this remarkably
complex issue is to look for conclusions drawn by groups of scientists
who seek to find consensus among experts. Their reports are a much
more helpful guide in developing policy responses than relying on indi-
vidual studies, because the synthesis reports are, in theory at least, based
on studies that have undergone additional peer review and scrutiny.
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The most important such scientific consensus-building body is the
United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC.'
In 1988, the General Assembly of the United Nations asked the World
Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme to
create a panel of scientists to study the risk of anthropogenic climate
change and to provide "balanced, objective policy advice" to govern-
ments of the world to address the threat.2 Three working groups were
established to examine (1) climate science, (2) likely impacts of climate
change, and (3) options for mitigating or reducing the threat. 3 The IPCC
was created in response to this request. Thousands of scientists from
around the world have written reports and thousands more have served as
reviewers. These scientists are nominated by their governments to serve
on IPCC panels. All the scientists have donated their time and none has
been paid for the work completed. The reports are written by a team of
authors who are recognized as leading experts in the field in which they
write and work from peer-reviewed scientific and technical literature.
Reports are themselves subject to broad peer review and produced
through a transparent process that also involves government officials
from countries around the world to agree to the summary language.
Each report includes a "summary for policymakers" to ensure the analy-
sis is relevant to the policy making process. This combination of peer
reviewed science and political efforts to secure broad acceptance of the
major conclusions has allowed the IPCC to bridge the worlds of science
and politics. 5
1. The IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2007, along with former Vice
President Al Gore, for its work in raising awareness around the world of the threat of climate
change. Press Release, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Expresses Surprise and
Gratitude at Announcement of Nobel Peace Prize (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press-
releases/pr- 12october2007.pdf.
2. Id.
3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 16 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE CLIMATE CONVENTION 2 (2004), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/lOth-anniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf [hereinafter IPCC, SCIENTIFIC
ASSESSMENT).
4. Union of Concerned Scientists, The IPCC: Who Are They and Why Do Their Climate
Reports Matter?, http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science/the-ipcc.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2008).
5. Since uncertainty is a key theme in the climate research reviewed by IPCC working
groups, their reports seek to carefully express the amount of evidence available and the degree of
agreement among scientists. The level of agreement is described from low to high, as is the amount
of evidence. The level of confidence seeks to reflect agreement among scientists about the correct-
ness of a model or analysis and the language used is as follows:
Very high confidence at least 9 out of 10 chance of being correct
High confidence about 8 of 10 chance
Medium confidence about 5 of 10 chance
Low confidence about 2 of 10 chance
Very low confidence less than 1 out of 10 chance
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GUIDANCE NOTES FOR LEAD AUTHORS OF THE
IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT ON ADDRESSING UNCERTAINTIES 3-4 (2005), available at
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The first IPCC report was submitted to the UN General Assembly in
1990 and led to negotiations that culminated in the 2002 Framework
Convention on Climate Change signed by attendees of the Rio Earth
Summit.6 The report argued that there was a significant likelihood that
human emissions of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping greenhouse
gas emissions were warming the average temperature of the earth and
that climate-based disruptions are already occurring in different regions
and will become even more disruptive in the future.7  The fourth report
or assessment, like the earlier versions, was the result of a tremendous
amount of scientific effort.8  Working Group I's February 2007 report,
for example, was based on the work of some 600 contributing authors in
40 countries, more than 30,000 comments from external reviewers, and
editing of the summary report for policy makers by representatives from
113 governments. 9 The report concludes that scientific research leads to
a "very high confidence that the global average net effect of human ac-
tivities since 1750 has been one of warming" and that "[w]arming of the
climate system is unequivocal." 10
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf. Likelihood is used to
reflect the probability of a particular outcome having occurred or occurring in the future. The prob-
ability range and corresponding terms used in the reports are as follows:
Virtually certain >99% probability of occurrence
Very likely >90% probability
Likely >66% probability
About as likely as not 33 to 66% probability
Unlikely <33% probability
Very unlikely <10% probability
Exceptionally unlikely <1% probability
These terms are used throughout IPCC reports in italics in order to make as transparent as possible
the judgments made by authors about the scientific research they synthesize and assess. Id.
6. IPCC, SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Id. at3.
8. Reports issued by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are the most im-
portant summary assessments of climate change science. The Fourth Assessment Report, actually
issued in a series of reports throughout 2007 and culminating in a synthesis report in November,
includes work done by three groups: WORKING GROUP 1, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wgl.htm [hereinafter WORKING GROUP I, PHYSICAL SCIENCE
BASIS] (examining the interaction of human and natural factors that contribute to climate change);
WORKING GROUP I1, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION,
AND VULNERABILITY (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm (focusing on how climate change affects natural and
human systems, their vulnerability to these changes, and their capacity to adapt); and WORKING
GROUP III, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MITIGATION (Bert Metz et al. eds.,
2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm (examining the scientific, techno-
logical, environmental, economic, and social aspects of mitigation, including technologies and
policies that are most likely to reduce the magnitude of change); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (Rajendra K. Pachauri
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm [hereinafter IPCC,
SYNTHESIS REPORT].
9. WORKING GROUP I, PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 8, at v, vii.
10. Id. at 3, 5.
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The November 2007 synthesis report stated that "[o]bservational
evidence from all continents and most oceans," the authors of the report
wrote, "shows that many natural systems are being affected by regional
climate changes, particularly temperature increases."1 Most of the ob-
served increase in globally-averaged temperatures since the mid-
twentieth century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropo-
genic GHG concentrations.1 2 It is likely there has been significant an-
thropogenic warming over the past fifty years averaged over each conti-
nent (except Antarctica).13 Emissions from humans have very likely con-
tributed to sea level rise, likely contributed to changes in wind patterns
and extra-tropical storm tracks and temperature patterns, increased tem-
peratures of extreme hot nights, cold nights, and cold days, and more
likely than not contributed to the increased risk of heat waves, droughts,
and the frequency of heavy precipitation events. 14 Anthropogenic warm-
ing over the last three decades has likely had a discernible influence at
the global scale on observed changes in many physical and biological
systems.15 These changes are very unlikely to be due to natural variabil-
ity.
16
Particularly significant is the conclusion of the 2007 report that
"discernible human influences now extend to other aspects of climate,
including ocean warming, continental-average temperatures, temperature
extremes and wind patterns" and its emphasis on current evidence con-
cerning the effects of global warming, including rising arctic tempera-
tures, sea level rise, warming of the permafrost, more intense and longer
droughts, an increase in heavy precipitation events, and an increase in
intense tropical cyclone activity. 7 Many climate scientists have con-
cluded that the nature, magnitude, and extent of the impacts of global
warming are so large and threatening and the atmospheric life-time of
GHGs is so long that immediate action is required to begin to reduce
emissions over time, that it is prudent to reduce the risk of climate
change and irrational not to take preventative steps to reduce that risk.
Many scientists believe the IPCC reports issued in 2007 likely understate
the threats, while a few continue to argue that the risks may be over-
stated. The melting of ice at the poles and the collapse of ice sheets, for
example, have occurred much more rapidly than scientists predicted. 8
While there are tremendous uncertainties, the unambiguous trend in the
steady increase in scientific research confirms the seriousness of the
11. IPCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
12. Id. at5.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. WORKING GROUP I, PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 8, at 5-10.
18. Doug Struck, At the Poles, Melting Occurring at Alarming Rate, WASH. POST, Oct. 22,
2007, at A10.
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threat of disruptive climate change. Uncertainties can cut both ways, and
the disruptions caused by growing levels of GHGs may be much greater
than anticipated. Taking actions to reduce the threat, as well as helping
those who must adapt to these disruptive changes, will likely be one of
the most important collective tasks of the 21 st century.
The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), to
which most of the countries of the world, including the United States, are
signatories, commits those nations to "stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system."' 9  There is no
agreement on what concentration level would ensure that the FCCC goal
of preventing "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system" be met, 20 but leading climate scientists argue that, given the evi-
dence that global change is already doing damage, it is not likely that
"any level equivalent to more than a doubling of the pre-industrial CO 2
concentration could plausibly be considered compliant with the conven-
tion.' Much of the scientific debate has centered on the conclusion that
temperature increase should be kept to no more than two degrees Centi-
grade in order to ensure that the impacts of climate change will be rela-
tively modest. An atmospheric CO 2 concentration of 450 parts per mil-
lion (ppm) (current levels are about 425 ppm) would likely be required to
satisfy the FCCC goal.2 2
In order to stabilize the CO 2 concentration at 450 ppm, these scien-
tists have concluded that emissions will need to be cut by 60-80 percent
of 1990 levels by mid-century.23 This goal is fraught with uncertainties
because of feedback mechanisms that are not well understood or difficult
to predict. But if the average temperature increases by more than two
degrees Centigrade, scientists fear the planet would enter into uncharted
waters, where the temperature would be hotter than it has been for hun-
dreds of thousands of years and would create an environment much dif-
ferent than the one in which current life has evolved. The policy chal-
lenge is to regulate markets so that prices are high enough to ensure that
they include the costs of keeping emissions at safe levels.
19. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
849 (1994).
20. Id
21. John P. Holdren, The Energy-Climate Challenge: Issues for the New US. Administration,
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II. How CAN MARKETS REFLECT THE TRUE COSTS OF
CARBON EMISsIoNS?
Carbon emissions permeate modem economic life. Very few goods
and services escape the use of electricity produced from fossil fuels or
transportation powered by those fuels. The following figure, based on
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) inventory of greenhouse
gas emissions, illustrates the broad scope of those emissions. About one-
third comes from the generation of electricity; transportation sources are
responsible for about 28 percent, industrial sources contribute 19 percent,
and agricultural, commercial, and household sources emit the balance.24
The EPA reports emissions in terms of teragrams of CO 2 equivalent; in
2005, total U.S. GHG emissions were 7,260 Tg CO 2, an increase of 16.3
percent since 1990 (one teragram equals 1,000,000,000,000 grams).
Emissions of CO 2 increased by 20.3 percent during those years, while
methane and nitrous oxide emissions fell by 11.5 and 2.8 percent, respec-
tively.26 U.S. emissions were partly offset by carbon sequestration in
biological life such as forests, urban trees, and agricultural soils that off-
set 11.4 percent of the total emissions.27
Figure 128
Key Sources of Direct U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
by Economic Sector (2005)
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24. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2005, at ES-14 (2007), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads06/07CR.pdf.
25. Id. at ES-3.
26. Id. at ES-4.
27. Id. at ES-4-6.
28. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 110TH CONG., CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: SCOPE OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 7 (2007), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/ClimateChange/WhitePaper. 100307.pdf.
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There are a number of ways we might try to reduce carbon emis-
sions and their role in climate change. We could enact laws and imple-
ment policies that ban certain products that release high levels of carbon,
as we did in enacting amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1990 to ban
products that use certain chlorofluorocarbons and threaten the strato-
spheric ozone layer, in response to the Montreal Protocol. 29 We can re-
duce the release of carbon by imposing efficiency standards on sources
of carbon emissions, such as the corporate average fuel efficiency
(CAFt) standards imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers or efficiency
standards for appliances, industrial equipment, lighting, and buildings.3 °
We can subsidize low carbon energy sources such as wind, solar, and
hydropower, and encourage people to use less energy or cleaner forms of
energy through educational campaigns. We can require electricity pro-
ducers to shift to cleaner burning fuels, such as natural gas, and to se-
quester carbon emissions rather than releasing them into the atmosphere.
We can also act to ensure that energy prices include the costs result-
ing from the carbon emissions from energy production and use. This
approach, as well as those listed above, are not mutually exclusive. A
combination of approaches can and will need to be pursued to reduce
carbon emissions. But in an economic system dominated by markets,
and fundamentally organized by markets, it makes a great deal of sense
to focus on correcting those markets so they reflect the true costs of pro-
ducing energy. Economic theory is simple, straightforward, and compel-
ling here, and does not even require a supply and demand chart. Markets
promise to produce decisions about production and consumption that
reflect the interests of consumers and promote the most economically
efficient use of the available resources. If markets reflect all the costs
associated with goods and services, and consumers have perfect informa-
tion about the costs and benefits of alternatives, then markets will be able
to produce the benefits they promise. The task of law and policy is to
ensure that, as much as possible, true cost prices dominate and accurate
information is available, because producers also have an incentive to
maximize their profits by externalizing as many costs as possible.
Well-functioning markets can also appeal to advocates of fairness
and justice in that externalities impose burdens and harms on individuals
who do not benefit from transactions that fail to reflect true costs; in the
case of climate change, for example, they may bear some or many of the
burdens such as disruptive changes to their environment, but they receive
few of the benefits that buyers and sellers enjoy. Residents of island
nations that are threatened by rising sea levels largely do not benefit from
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671 (West 2008); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541.
30. The most recent energy legislation, enacted by Congress in December, 2007, included all
of these measures as a way to reduce energy consumption and to reduce GHG emissions. Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007).
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the jobs, salaries, air conditioning, heating, transportation, and products
that also produce carbon emissions, or at least do not enjoy the benefits
in proportion to the burdens they face. Reducing those externalities is a
moral imperative as well as an economic one.
The two most widely discussed ways of internalizing the costs of
carbon into markets are carbon taxes and carbon cap-and-trade programs.
Carbon taxes can take a variety of forms, from taxes on fuels, calculated
based on their carbon content, to taxes imposed on those who consume
energy and other goods and services implicated in carbon emissions.
Cap-and-trade programs set a ceiling or cap on total allowable emissions,
allocate allowances or permits to carbon sources that set a cap on their
individual emissions, and then allow the sources to meet their cap by a
combination of reducing their emissions and buying excess allowances
from other sources that have reduced their emissions beyond their cap
and have extra allowances to sell.
Carbon taxes are an attractive policy option to help reduce GHG
emissions, despite the political barriers imposed by the idea of raising
taxes. If they are sufficiently high, carbon taxes can create clear incen-
tives to reduce emissions. Unlike emission standards that, once met,
provide no incentive for further innovations, taxes provide a continuous
reason to find ways to reduce emissions. Taxes can raise revenue that
can finance investments in energy conservation, improved efficiency,
and renewable energy sources. They can help produce more efficient
markets by ensuring that prices include more of the total costs of produc-
ing and using goods and services. Compared to a cap-and-trade policy,
carbon taxes can be relatively simple to explain and easy to design and
implement. The level of the tax can be raised and lowered as needed to
ensure the necessary reductions in emissions are achieved. In sum, car-
bon taxes have significant benefits:
* Simpler to design and implement and easier to understand and ex-
plain;
* Can be put in place more quickly;
" Less likelihood of cheating;
" Predictability in energy prices;
" Can address more sectors of the economy;
* Creates a revenue stream that can be used to reduce other taxes or
fund energy efficiency and renewables or pay for mitigation;
* Easy to adjust up or down if necessary to achieve environmental
and economic goals.
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Cap-and-trade approaches to reducing GHG emissions have some
serious shortcomings. The compliance costs are uncertain and difficult
to plan for in business and government decision making. The design of
the program is complex, involving difficult choices such as at what level
the cap should be set, to whom the allowances allocated under the cap
should be given, whether allowances should be sold or distributed for
free, and how long the allowances should last before they expire. The
implementation of a program is just as daunting, requiring accurate
monitoring and reporting of emissions, enforcement of allowance caps,
and the imposition of sanctions for violations. Once allowances are allo-
cated, they are difficult to retrieve if too many are distributed because
their distribution can create expectations of rights of ownership that are
difficult to reverse. Allocation decisions must be made within a context
of uncertainty, and adjustments are difficult to make. Cap-and-trade
programs have significant benefits as well:
e They do not suffer from the political opposition generated by calls
to raise taxes;
* Cap-and-trade programs like acid rain have been successful in
achieving their goals at lower cost than expected;
" They can be integrated with international cap-and-trade programs;
" Allowances can be auctioned to fund clean energy projects;
" If accurately set, the cap ensures environmental protection goals
are achieved; carbon tax may not achieve that goal;
* The resulting market sets the price of carbon, and channels re-
sources to projects more efficiently.
There are tremendous challenges involved in designing and imple-
menting an effective cap-and-trade program to reduce the threat of cli-
mate change. But if those challenges can be addressed, it is an important
part of the overall effort to reduce the threat of climate change. A cap-
and-trade approach focuses on the key issue of what is required in order
to secure a healthy environment. While it is difficult to know what ex-
actly the cap should be, it focuses attention on the need to make policy
decisions based on the best scientific evidence we have. Contrary to the
argument made by tax advocates that we need policies with fixed eco-
nomic costs and who reject cap-and-trade becauso the costs are uncer-
tain, we need to give priority to trying to determine what is required to
secure a stable climate, rather than setting an arbitrary limit on the
amount of money to be spent on climate stabilization. Cap-and-trade
discussions begin with the right question, even if the answer is not al-
ways clear.
As is true of a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade program seeks to ensure
that markets reflect true costs. A carbon tax that reflects the true cost of
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emitting carbon in producing goods and services would help achieve that
purpose, but it is difficult to know what level of taxation does that. If a
cap is well enough designed so that it will achieve the environmental
goal, it then establishes a market mechanism for determining true costs.
Prices for goods and services containing carbon, for example, if they are
determined in a market shaped by such a carbon cap, will reflect at least
the climate change-related costs. One major problem here, of course, is
that there is not an unambiguous cap for climate change; there is no point
at which we shift from no climate change to climate change, but it is a
matter of degree. But we do have an emerging agreement among climate
scientists, discussed above, that, at least for now, our goal ought to be an
80 percent reduction in GHG levels, from 1990 levels, by 2050, in order
to keep the concentration of GHGs at no more than 450 ppm and the
temperature rise at no more than two degrees Centigrade. 31 Setting the
cap there, then auctioning allowances to all sources so that total emis-
sions do not exceed the cap, allows markets to allocate scarcity in the
most economically efficient manner, and avoids the very difficult politi-
cal challenge of allocating emission allowances. Again, this is an impre-
cise calculation, fraught with difficulties and uncertainties, but it focuses
attention on securing environmental quality and then using markets to
achieve that goal, rather than putting an economic goal first.
Industries typically favor trading programs rather than taxes be-
cause trading programs usually distribute allowances for free. Taxes
represent clearly visible cost increases, and most politicians also shy
away from them. If a carbon tax could be uniformly applied to create a
level playing field, it might be attractive to industries because it would
make their compliance efforts much simpler than a cap-and-trade
scheme. But a carbon tax would reward some industries and fuels, while
penalizing others, and the creation of winners and losers make the poli-
tics of designing a carbon tax very dicey. Both cap-and-trade and carbon
tax policies are difficult to design and implement in the face of powerful
interests' ability to exert political pressure.
III. WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR AN EFFECTIVE CARBON CAP-AND-TRADE
PROGRAM?
Carbon trading programs typically trace their origins to the federal
acid rain program. The Clean Air Act of 1990 established a cap-and-
trade system to reduce acid rain-producing emissions from coal-fired
power plants.32 The heart of the acid rain emissions trading system is the
idea of a cap on total emissions projected, by the year 2010, to result in a
reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions of ten million tons from 1980 lev-
els.33 The targets of the acid rain program are likely to be met, and at a
31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 2008).
33. Id. § 7651.
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much lower cost than expected if the cap-and-trade program had not
been developed and implemented. The following figure summarizes the
success of the acid rain program. Research suggests that the problem of
acid deposition is far from solved, and that many lakes, streams, and
forests continue to suffer from the effects of sulfur dioxide emissions.
The problem requires further study but it appears that the cap may have
been too low, or the goal of one cap may not adequately take into ac-
count the variety in the susceptibility of different areas to the effects of
acid rain.34 These problems highlight how critical it is to devise a cap
that will ensure the environmental goal is achieved, and that is no small
task for climate change.
Figure 235
The U.S. Acid Rain Program
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In the United States, carbon cap-and-trade proposals are being de-
veloped at the regional and national level. The Northeastern states and
Eastern Canadian provinces have formed the Regional Greenhouse Gas
36Initiative (RGGI) that is a cap-and-trade program for power plants.
The Midwest GHG Accord (MW GHG Accord), involving northern
Midwest states, is in its earliest stages.3 7 The Western Climate Initiative
(WCI), also early in its development, is developing a cap-and-trade pro-
gram for Western states and provinces.38 In Congress, the leading carbon
cap-and-trade bill is the Lieberman-Warner bill, passed by the Senate
34. ELLEN BAUM, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WHY THE ACID RAIN
PROBLEM IS NOT SOLVED 1 (2001), http://www.catf.us/publications/reports/AcidRainReport.pdf
(explaining that acid rain is still a problem for Atlantic salmon populations in Nova Scotia, lakes in
Canada and New York, streams in Virginia, fish diversity in Northern Pennsylvania, and red spruce
and sugar maples in the Northeast).
35. Environmental Defense Fund, The Cap and Trade Success Story,
http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=1085 (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
36. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
37. See MIDWESTERN GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, MIDWESTERN GREENHOUSE GAS ACCORD
(2007), available at http://www.midwestemgovemors.org/resolutions/GHGAccord.pdf.
38. See The Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ (last visited
Mar. 28, 2008).
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Environment & Public Works Committee in December 2007, and await-
ing further action in 2008. 39 Several bills have been introduced in the
House, but had not been reported out by a committee as of February
2008. The leading committee with jurisdiction over the issue is the
House Energy & Commerce Committee. To move the debate forward,
the Committee is issuing a series of white papers; the first paper, issued
in 2007, focuses on the design of a carbon cap-and-trade program.4°
The most developed carbon program is the European Union Emis-
sions Trading System (EU ETS). 41 The EU is made up of 27 member
states. Its powers are more limited than that of the U.S. federal govern-
ment; the EU issues directives and members and member states enact
laws and issue regulations that bind sources within their boundaries.
Phase I of the EU ETS was a pilot phase, from 2005-07;42 in 2008, phase
II began.43 It is a binding program designed to help the EU meet its
GHG reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol, which takes effect from
2008-12.44 The progress so far in developing or implementing these
trading programs provides a number of important lessons to guide a dis-
cussion of what we should focus on in designing an effective carbon
trading program.
Pre-empting States. One key question is whether there should be a
national trading system or whether we should encourage regional pro-
grams. A national system is essential in developing an effort that en-
gages the entire country, but in the absence of a federal program, re-
gional programs provide opportunities to experiment with alternative
approaches. A major problem with regional programs is that they may
reduce emissions within the participating states, but emissions may in-
crease outside of the boundaries. For example, if states agree to limit
production of electricity from conventional coal-fired power plants,
power from such plants might continue to be produced outside the sys-
tem. If the regional program is designed to incorporate all of the states
within an electricity transmission network, this problem of leakage can
be minimized. More broadly, a national carbon trading program can
allow states to continue to experiment, but careful coordination is re-
39. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S.B. 2191, 110th Cong. § 4(7) (2007), available
at http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsabill.pdf
40. STAFF OF H.R. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: APPROPRIATE ROLES FOR THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT (2008), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/ClimateChange/white%20
paper/o20st-lcl%20roles%20fmal%202-22.pdf.
41. See European Union Emissions Trading System, http://www.euets.com/ (last visited Mar.
28, 2008).
42. Judit Zegnhl, EC Toughens up for Next Phase of Emission Trading, European Union
Emissions Trading System, Oct. 16-22, 2006, available at http://www.euets.con/index.php?
page=news&newsid=42&l = 1.
43. Id.
44. Id; see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1977 37 1.L.M. 22 (2007).
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quired to ensure regional systems develop common approaches that can
eventually be integrated.
This is part of a broader question of whether a state carbon program,
to include regulatory standards such as emission limits on motor vehi-
cles, should be preempted by federal legislation. The Senate bill protects
state innovations from federal preemption, while Chairman of the House
Energy & Commerce Committee John Dingell (D-MI) strongly favors
preempting states in order to have one national standard.45 Most industry
groups have lobbied hard for a national standard, but state authority is
critical in allowing states to continue to experiment with alternative ap-
proaches and to promote policy innovation.
Developing Accurate Inventories. Another key issue is the devel-
opment of an accurate inventory in order to determine the allocation of
allowances and selecting a baseline from which reductions are calcu-
lated. On May 8, 2007, more than 30 states signed on as charter mem-
bers of The Climate Registry, a collaboration aimed at developing a
common system for entities to report greenhouse gas emissions.46 Cana-
dian provinces and Native American nations have joined the effort.47
There are a host of important issues involved in fashioning accurate
GHG inventories. For example, the World Business Council for Sustain-
able Development and the World Resources Institute's Greenhouse Gas
Protocol Initiative suggests the following principles to guide GHG ac-
counting and reporting:
* Define boundaries that appropriately reflect the GHG emissions of
the business and the decision-making needs of users.
o Account for all GHG emissions sources and activities within the
chosen organizational and operational boundaries. Any specific ex-
clusions should be stated and justified.
e Allow meaningful comparison of emissions performance over
time. Any changes to the basis of reporting should be clearly stated
to enable continued valid comparison.
9 Address all relevant issues in a factual and coherent manner, based
on a clear audit trail. Important assumptions should be disclosed and
appropriate references made to the calculation methodologies used.
45. STAFF OF H.R. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 25.
46. Press Release, The Climate Registry, Dozens of States Join the Climate Registry to Track
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (May 8, 2007), available at http://www.theclimateregistry.org/
TheClimateRegistryPressRelease.pdf.
47. Id.
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* Exercise due diligence to ensure that GHG calculations have the
precision needed for their intended use, and provide reasonable as-
surance on the integrity of reported GHG information.
48
Another challenge is defining and verifying emissions throughout
the life cycle of a product. Emissions can occur from the processing of
raw materials purchased for manufacturing, as a result of the production
of the electricity used in manufacturing components, and from the trans-
portation, use, and disposal of products, and from other activities. These
complex calculations must be broad and inclusive to ensure emissions
are not excluded. 49  Reporting and monitoring mechanisms need to be
efficiently integrated with requirements under environmental laws in
order to minimize the costs of participating in the program.
Determining the benchmark is also difficult. The generation of
GHG reduction credits is based on the calculation of the level of GHGs
that would have been emitted in the absence of a project. This is a hypo-
thetical figure that is difficult to calculate. There is a strong incentive for
sources and nations to inflate their GHG inventory in order to be in a
position to claim more reduction credits. Governments may be hard
48. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL: A CORPORATE
ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARD 7 (2001), http://www.wbcsd.org/web/publications/ghg-
protocol.pdf. A related issue centers on defining the boundaries of a firm's emissions. The World
Resources Institute report suggests that companies use organizational boundaries for determining
GHG emissions responsibility that are consistent with boundaries established for financial reporting.
Id. at 14-15. They recommend that emission inventories include emissions over which companies
have "significant control" and represent direct emissions as well as indirect ones resulting from the
electricity they purchase. Id. at 43. Control is defined as "the ability of a company to direct the
operating policies of another entity/facility. Usually, if the company owns more than 50 percent of
the voting interests, this implies control." Id. at 15. Significant influence is a function of the follow-
ing factors: (1) "the company owns voting interests of between 20 and 50 percent"; (2) "the com-
pany has the power to participate in the entity's/facility's financial and operating policy decisions";
and (3) "the company has a long-term interest in the entity/facility." Id. The reports recommend the
following emissions be reported, as detennined by the specific business and industry context and
based on accepted financial and accounting standards:
* All GHG emissions from those entities/facilities which are defined as being con-
trolled-wholly owned and not wholly owned but controlled;
" The equity share emissions from jointly controlled assets/entities; and
" The equity share of emissions from entities/facilities over which the reporting com-
pany has significant influence but does not control.
Id. at 15-16.
Direct emissions include production of electricity, heat, and steam; physical or chemical process-
ing; transportation of materials, products, waste, and employees; and fugitive emissions. Id. at 21.
Indirect emissions include emissions associated with the generation of imported or purchased elec-
tricity, heat, and steam, and should be reported separately. Id. Other indirect emissions that could
be reported include employee business travel; transportation of products, materials, and waste;
outsourced activities, contract manufacturing, and franchises; emissions from waste generated by the
reporting company that actually occur at other sites not owned by the company, such as methane
from landfills; emissions from the use and end-of-life phases of products and services produced by
the reporting company; employees commuting to and from work; and production of imported mate-
rials. Id.
49. See CHRISTOPHER P. LORETrI ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AN
OVERVIEW OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION VERIFICATION ISSUES 39 (2001),
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/emissions-verification.pdf
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pressed to be able to calculate accurate baselines. There will be strong
incentives to establish generous baselines and credits. The calculation of
credits requires certifying bodies to be able to ensure that reductions are
permanent and additional. Should projects aimed at reducing local air
pollution be eligible for funding as a source of GHG credits? Should
projects planned for other reasons be part of the baseline? Should gov-
ernments be able to claim credits for reducing subsidies, reforming
prices, deregulating economic sectors, and restructuring energy produc-
tion?
Setting a Cap. Setting the cap on total emissions is a critical deci-
sion. Deciding what GHGs to include is critical here. Most trading pro-
grams just include CO 2; the Senate bill includes all six GHGs.5° One
option is to aim for the goal of an 80 percent reduction by 2050, with
intermediate goals or benchmarks to ensure progress. A number of states
have already set caps, and the size of the caps and deadlines vary greatly,
as shown in the following table:
Table 151
GHG Caps and Dates
Year Cap
2100 75% cut: RI
2050 75-80% cut: CA, CO, CT, FL, MA, ME, MN, NJ, NM, OR NH
& VT, no date
50-60% cut: AZ (by 2040), IL, WA
2035 25% below 1990 levels: WA
2025 back to 1990 levels: FL; back to 2000 levels: VA; 30% cut: MN
2020 back to 2000 levels: AZ; back to 1990 levels: CA, HI, IL, NJ,
WA
10% cut below 1990 levels: MA, ME, NM, NY, OR, RI, VT;
20% cut below 2005: CO
2017 back to 2000 levels: FL
2015 15% cut: MN
2012 back to 2000 levels: NM
2010 back to 2000 levels: CA; back to 1990 levels: CT, MA, ME,
NH, RI, VT
50. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S.B. 2191, 110th Cong. § 4(15) (2007), avail-
able at http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsabill.pdf.
51. PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101, STATE ACTIoN 3,7,
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/101_States.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
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Determining Who Is Required to Hold Allowances. RGGI only ap-
plies to fossil-fuel fired electric generating units > 25 megawatts (Mw) of
power.52 The EU ETS regulates downstream installations-those that
actually release emissions. This includes 11,500 large stationary sources
and installations; motor vehicles are not included; airplanes may be
added later.53 The Senate bill covers 87 percent of total emissions; the
House bill focuses on large sources. 54 While there are hundreds of thou-
sands of GHG emitters, most of the emissions come from major sources,
so the regulatory task is not quite as daunting as it might appear, as dem-
onstrated by the following figure.
Figure 355
Large Emitters of CO2 from Fossil Fuel Combustion in Each
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Allocating Initial Allowances. A major issue is whether allowances
should be auctioned or distributed for free. Auctioning allowances has
52. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE at 21 (2007), available at
http://www.rggi.orgidocs/model-rule-corrected-1_5_07.pdf.
53. Peter Zapfel, European Commission, Webinar Regarding the EU Emission Trading
Scheme, available at www.climatechange.utah.gov/docs/Webinar 5.ppt (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
54. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S.B. 2191, 110th Cong. §§ 3101, 3201 (2007),
available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsabill.pdf.
55. STAFF OF H.R. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 40, at 17.
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many advantages. Allowances are allocated through a market mecha-
nism, promoting their efficient allocation. Sources that have reduced
emissions voluntarily are not punished, because they now need to pur-
chase fewer allowances, while those that have put off reductions have to
buy more. The revenues from the auctions can be used to subsidize
emissions-reducing activities, fund research and development, help meet
adaptation costs, and for other relevant purposes. Auctions can raise
prices of high-emitting processes and facilities and encourage reductions.
But auctions are strongly opposed by industries that naturally prefer their
free distribution, and many carbon trading programs anticipate an initial
free distribution, with auctions to come later. RGGI is proposing at least
25 percent of the allowances be allocated for consumer benefit and/or
strategic energy purpose (end use energy efficiency) and 75 percent be
left up to states.56 Under the EU ETS, national allocation plans distribute
allowances; up to five percent were auctioned in phase I; up to 10 per-
cent in phase II.57 The Senate bill gives less than 50 percent of allow-
ances to states for load serving electricity generating entities and farmers
and foresters for sequestering; the balance goes to regulated sources; 15
years into the program, over 70 percent are to be auctioned; the balance
are to be given to states and entities above, and not to specific facilities.58
Determining Whether to Allow Offsets. Offsets are allowances or
credits that regulated entities can purchase by investing in projects that
emit fewer GHGs, such as electricity-generating windmills, or that se-
quester carbon, such as tree plantations. Sources may find it cheaper to
pay for these offset programs than to reduce their emissions. From the
perspective of economic efficiency, for example, trading should be as
broad as possible and be open to as many parties as possible. But trading
also poses the problem of appearing to allow sources to buy credits from
others rather than reducing their emissions. There are also concerns that
trading will allow sources to invest in carbon sequestration projects with
uncertain or only temporary benefits rather than actually reducing their
emissions.
Projects aimed at reducing GHG emissions or increasing carbon
sinks may create incentives for increased emissions/decreased sinks
elsewhere. For example, if some sources shift away from using coal, that
might deflate coal prices and stimulate increased use by others. Carbon
sequestration may be pursued through investments in plantations that
displace farmers and encourage them to move to other areas and cut
down trees for croplands. One of the cheapest ways of generating GHG
credits is to invest in the protection or expansion of carbon sinks, such as
56. RGGI, OVERVIEW OF RGGI 4, http://www.rggi.org/docs/mourggi-overviewl12 20
05.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
57. EU ETS, Auction 2006, The Auction's Legislative Background,
http://www.euets.com/index.php?page=75&l=l (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
58. §§3101,3201.
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planting trees and no-till cultivation. But this raises numerous problems,
such as how to determine what the baseline is of carbon sequestration
before a project is pursued, so that credits can be accurately calculated.
Under RGGI, offsets are limited to specific kinds of projects, inde-
pendent verification is required, and they can come from other RGGI
states or other states that have signed memoranda of understanding with
RGGI officials.59 Each source may cover up to 3.3 percent of its total
obligation with offsets; if prices reach $7/ton, offsets can satisfy five
percent of total obligations; if they reach $10/ton, offsets can be used for
up to 10 percent of the obligation.60 Offsets under the EU ETS are gov-
emed by the Kyoto Protocol, which requires that offsets are permanent,
verifiable, and additional (beyond business as usual and clearly demon-
strated to be an additional step taken expressly to reduce GHGs).6  No
offsets are allowed for nuclear power or carbon sinks; limited offsets are
available for hydropower, and all offsets must be less than 13.5 percent
of the national cap.62 The Senate bill allows sources to meet up to 15
percent of their cap from offsets; an additional 15 percent can be credits
from foreign markets if EPA-certified; and another 15 percent can be
borrowed from future year caps; the term of loan is 5 years with 10 per-
cent interest.63
The experience under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
illustrates how emissions trading programs can fail. According to Victor
and Cullenward, about one-third of all CDM pipeline credits have been
generated by controlling trifluoromethane or HFC-23, a byproduct from
manufacturing. 64 In the industrialized nations, plants have installed de-
vices to remove the emissions. However, in the developing countries,
manufacturers have not installed the equipment in order to keep their
emissions high and to position themselves to sell credits to EU sources
looking for ways to offset their emissions. These companies are ex-
pected to make profits of more than $12 billion through 2012.65 If the
wealthy countries would have simply paid for these companies to install
HFC-23 controls, the total cost would only have been $136 million.66
Simply because a market mechanism is in place, there is no guarantee
that it will operate efficiently.67
59. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATTVE MODEL RULE, supra note 52, at 63.
60. Id.
61. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 44, at Art. 3.
62. Zapfel, supra note 53.
63. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S.B. 2191, 110th Cong. §§ 2301-2303 (2007),
available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsabill.pdf.
64. David G. Victor & Danny Cullenward, Making Carbon Markets Work, ScI. AM., Sept. 24,
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Deciding Whether to Include a Safety Valve. A safety valve is a
mechanism that ensures prices of allowances that sources buy to meet
their obligations do not exceed a certain price. It has been a key issue in
congressional debates as industry groups lobby for limits on the cost of
the program. While it brings some certainty to compliance costs, safety
valves threaten to violate the idea of an environmentally-determined
emissions cap. They may represent a political compromise between the
environmental protection goal and keeping a lid on compliance costs, but
that comes at the price of reducing the efficiency of the market. RGGI
deals with the issue by allowing offsets, as described above. 68 If prices
are > $10/ton, sources can buy international offsets that are regulated
under the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS does not include a safety valve.
Ensuring Accurate Monitoring, Compliance, and Enforcement. Ef-
fective enforcement that creates incentives for compliance is critical to
the success of carbon trading. But there are conflicting imperatives to be
balanced. Simple rules, minimal transaction costs, and other factors lead
to maximizing the volume of trading and the consequential benefits,
while effective compliance and enforcement places limits and costs on
the process. Sanctions for noncompliance must be developed. Who
should bear responsibility for non-fulfillment of conditions-the buyer?
the seller? government? It may be possible to devise insurance schemes,
funded by charges imposed on each transaction that can be used to pur-
chase credits to meet shortfalls. The system could include extra credits
to be used for such a purpose. Sanctions for failure to comply with con-
ditions could include a prohibition on future trading and reduction of
subsequent allowances by the number of credits in dispute. Generators
of credits may be required to demonstrate that real reductions have been
produced before trading can occur, as is the case in other commodity
markets, where producers must show that the product is available and
certify its quality. This requires strong political will to sanction parties
that fail to meet their obligations.
Enforcement provisions in existing trading programs vary consid-
erably. The RGGI, for example, is based on a three-year compliance
period. Allowances can be banked for future use, but borrowing from
future years' allowances is prohibited.69 Under the EU ETS, sources
must monitor and report annual emissions by March 31 for the previous
year.70 Emissions are based on calculations for different kinds of fuel.7'
68. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
69. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Public Review Model Review Draft, 3/23/06, sec.
XX-6.6, available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/publicreview-draft mr.pdf.
70. Council Directive 2003/87/EC 2003 O.J. (L275 25.10.2003) of the European Parliament
and of the Council, Oct. 13, 2003, establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance
trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (as amended by Council
Directive 2004/1/EC 2004 O.J. (L338 18 13.11.2004)) art. 15.
71. Id. annex IV.
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Self reporting is subject to third party verification.72 Sources must sur-
render allowances by April 30 for the previous year.73 The failure to
surrender allowances results in a fine of 100 euros/allowance and the
source must eventually surrender the allowance. 74 The name of non-
compliant companies is published (the "name and shame" penalty).
75
One of the biggest challenges to carbon trading is bringing develop-
ing countries into the regime. Given the volume of emissions from
China, India, and others, this is absolutely essential. And including the
developing countries in a regulatory program is a prerequisite for support
from members of Congress and others for U.S. involvement in a global
program. But these countries largely lack the kind of effective govern-
mental regulatory infrastructure and capacity that is required for an effec-
tive program. It is hard to envision a global carbon trading program
working until this key challenge is addressed. Otherwise, we run the risk
of leakage-i.e., that emissions might be reduced in one area but simply
increase in another.
IV. MAKING MARKETS WORK
Market forces largely drive the decisions about what goods and ser-
vices are produced, how they are produced and used, and what their envi-
ronmental consequences are. Making markets work better, by ensuring
that prices include more of the true costs of producing and consuming
goods and services, is essential in producing a more ecologically sustain-
able economic system. Because greenhouse gas emissions permeate the
economy, climate policies must be able to reach and reshape virtually all
sectors of the economy. A broadly based cap-and-trade program or a
carbon tax can provide the basic structure for ensuring markets do a bet-
ter job of taking into account the costs of carbon emissions. Generating
support for such an expensive political intervention into markets, one
that will raise prices significantly and will produce significant opposi-
tion, requires a clear understanding of the intersection of public policies
and markets.
Markets are inescapably located in and constrained by the natural
world. Natural resources are exhaustible and natural systems are, over-
all, irreplaceable. Capitalism is entirely dependent on the resources of
the natural world and its ability to process wastes, and only economic
activity that is consistent with ecological conditions and limits is ulti-
mately sustainable. For some, their faith in markets gives no room for
doubt about the viability of a world characterized by profound and grow-
ing inequality made acceptable by the promise of endless economic
72. Id. art. 16.
73. Id. art. 15.
74. Id. art. 16.
75. Id.
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growth. Effective governance is required to rescue capitalism from un-
sustainable environmental and economic trends, but part of the problem
with capitalist ideology is its commitment to weakening government, the
very thing on which its future depends.
Discussions of politics and markets often focuses on the differences
between political and market allocation of scarce resources. Politics is
denigrated as irrational, plagued by political calculations, pressures, and
incentives that are aimed at currying favor with powerful industries, in-
sulating and protecting industries rather than forcing them to compete,
and dominated by subsidies and pork barrel spending that are economi-
cally inefficient. Markets, in contrast, are paragons of virtue, designed to
provoke innovation, reduce costs, and expand choices.
Characterizing politics and markets as polar opposites is an attrac-
tive strategy for those who wish to reduce political decision making and
unleash private power, but it fundamentally misstates the nature of mar-
kets. Many markets fail to produce the benefits promised because they
do not work well; their prices do not reflect the true costs of goods and
services, because powerful interests that can externalize costs on third
parties have a strong incentive to do so. Excluding some costs increases
profits and expands market share, while imposing costs on other interests
that are powerless to protect against them, or are so widely disseminated
that there is little incentive to protest.
A more helpful approach looks at the intersection of politics and
markets and their inviolability. Effective markets require strong and
capable institutions to ensure that the benefits promised by markets are
realized, and are not amid the relentless push to maximize profits. Mar-
kets require strong and effective governmental institutions to assign
property rights, monitor emissions, and enforce requirements. Policy
design and implementation are essential in ensuring that carbon markets
produce the benefits they promise. If effective markets can be con-
structed and maintained, they can play a major role in reducing the threat
of climate change. Well-functioning markets are clearly only part of the
prescription. Regulations, subsidies, research, education, and other poli-
cies are also needed. And even if well functioning markets are estab-
lished, additional policies will be required to deal with the distributional
consequences of markets. Policies will need to address the impacts of
climate change and help those who suffer its disruptions adapt. Well-
functioning markets are part, but only part, of the broad set of actions
humankind will likely need to pursue throughout the century as it finds
ways to secure a healthy planet for all forms of life.
CONCLUSION
Carbon trading is only part of an efficient and effective response to
reducing the threat of climate change. Investments in energy and materi-
als efficiency, conservation, pollution prevention, renewable energy, and
982 DENVER UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 85:4
more efficient resource use make sense for economic and environmental
reasons apart from climate change. Because GHGs, once released, may
stay in the atmosphere for a hundred years or longer, immediate, precau-
tionary action is prudent as well as a long term risk reduction strategy.
The longer we wait to reduce the threat of climate change, the larger the
problem grows and the narrower our options become; the sooner we act,
the more options we will have in the future. Carbon trading programs
can produce valuable experience about how market-based systems can
work to find the most cost-effective ways to reduce GHG emissions and
help secure a stable climate.
